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1 Introduction
This volume explores and critically discusses the relation between argumentation
and logic, which is of particular importance as these two disciplines have been
tightly connected since the origin of modern argumentation theory; and so were they
in the ancient reflection on rhetoric, from Aristotle onwards.
What the Editor claims at the beginning of his very well-thought Introduction is
that the volume aims at doing more than a simple overview of the connections
between two disciplines. Henrique J. Ribeiro inserts the study of argumentation and
logic into a broader philosophical framework, claiming that argumentation is the
new paradigm of human reason (p. 11) in post-modern reflection, which
characterizes the contemporary intellectual world. This is because argumentation
focuses on agreement rather than on truth (p. 4). As questionable as this claim might
be—I am not sure that its epistemological premises would be accepted by all
argumentation theorists—it certainly attributes enormous importance not only to
argumentation studies but also to the specific relation between argumentation and
logic as the kernel of all philosophical studies. When studying this relation, in fact,
we deal with a definition of human reason and its limits.
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2 On the Contents
The Editor deliberately chose not to introduce macro-sections in this volume in
order not to conceal the theoretical connections between the eighteen contributions
forming this collection, as he argues. This does not mean, however, that
classifications of such contributions are not possible. To start with, authors clearly
belong to different schools of thought, not to say disciplines. Some of them are
between the initiators of informal logic, while others are formal logicians; some are
scholars in philosophy, others in critical thinking; some have been working in
computer sciences and artificial intelligence as well; finally, some could be more
appropriately described as argumentation scholars—and most of these latter adopt
the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation theory.
Moreover, the eighteen papers have very different scopes. Some of them adopt a
theoretical approach, discussing the relation between logic and argumentation in
general, or revisiting the history of these disciplines in order to explore their
convergence as well as their specific characteristics. This is the case of almost the
first half of this volume (chapters 1–7), plus chapters 9, 11, 14, 15 and 17. Other
chapters are better qualified as case-studies, in which the different authors attempt at
making the logic-argumentation relationship clear in practice. Some of them analyse
a specific context of application for argumentation and/or logic: this is the case of
chapter 12, which deals with public deliberation; chapter 16, which is focused on
scientific controversies; as well as chapter 18, devoted to ‘‘logic and fiction’’. Other
chapters are concentrating on a specific theoretical problem, such as the tu quoque
fallacy (ch. 8), the argument from expert opinion (ch. 10) and presupposition (ch.
13).
More specifically, after the Editor’s introduction, the reflections presented in
chapter 1 (‘‘A little light logic’’), by Alec Fisher, originate from the author’s long
experience in teaching logic. He is in a unique position to describe how logic needs
argumentation if it is to describe natural language reasoning, starting from the
educational needs he started to acknowledge in the early 1970s. Fisher is not alone
in raising educational concerns in this volume; several of the contributors, in fact,
declare to have been inspired to consider the relation between logic and
argumentation by their first-hand experience as teachers (another prime example
of this is chapter 6 by Ralph Johnson).
In chapter 2 (‘‘Finding the logic in argumentation’’), Douglas Walton introduces
the concept of a defeasible logic which should work, in his opinion, as underlying
logical system for argumentation schemes. He also introduces Carneades, a
mathematical and computational model for argument mapping and evaluation which
admits of defeasible logic. Chapter 3 (‘‘The place of logic in argument studies’’), by
James Freeman, is also devoted to the province of logic in the study of
argumentative discourse. In particular, this author concentrates on whether logic
should consider the acceptability of premises (warrants) or not (see also Freeman
2005 and, within this volume, Hansen, pp. 102–103).
In Chapter 4 (‘‘Inference claims’’), David Hitchcock discusses the notion of
inference, which is common to argumentation and logic, analysing in particular
what it means for a conclusion to follow from given premises. Like the preceding
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chapter, which deals with premises, this contribution elaborates on two key-notions
in the relation between argumentation and logic, i.e. inference and conclusion.
Chapter 5 and 6 assume the vantage point of informal logic. In chapter 5 (‘‘An
enquiry into the methods of informal logic’’), Hans V. Hansen reviews the different
methods adopted by informal logicians in the study of argumentation, while chapter
6 (‘‘Informal logic and its contribution to argumentation theory’’), by Ralph J.
Johnson, constitutes an informative retrospective reflection on the historical
development of informal logic and on its past and present contributions to
argumentation theory.
In chapter 7 (‘‘The role of logic in analysing and evaluating argumentation’’),
Frans H. van Eemeren discusses the role of logic in argumentation in light of the
pragma-dialectical approach. In this perspective, logic is there to scrutinize the
validity of argument; but it never overlaps with the whole of an analysis of an
argumentative discussion. In ‘‘Charges of inconsistency and the tu quoque fallacy’’
(ch. 8), Bart Garssen brings van Eemeren’s conclusions forward by providing a
specific example of the place of logic in an argumentative reconstruction. In
particular, the tu quoque fallacy is explained in terms of a violation of the freedom
rule of a critical discussion rather than in mere formal logic terms (cf. van Eemeren
and Grootendorst 1992).
In chapter 9 (‘‘Formals and ties: Connecting argumentation studies with formal
disciplines’’), Erik C. Krabbe goes back to the possible uses of logic for the analysis
of argumentation. Beside the formalisation and evaluation of informal arguments,
the author acknowledges the importance of logic for conceptual clarification and
theoretical elucidation of concepts (see in particular pp. 173–174). The role he
attributes to different formal systems, in this sense, is contiguous to the
disambiguating role of semantic analysis discussed by Rigotti (2008).
Jan Albert van Laar (‘‘Logical criticism and argumentation schemes: Argument
from expert opinion as a case in point’’, ch. 10) discusses argumentation from expert
opinion from the point of view of what room there is for the opponent to put forward
logical criticism in response to an argument in which this argument scheme has
been applied. Expert opinion is taken as a case in point, albeit the author’s goal is to
define general criteria for logical criticism. Central to his contribution is the notion
of argumentation (or argument) scheme, which he compares to that of deductive
scheme (pp. 201–203). Argument schemes are one of the common themes for
several contributors to this volume (see in particular chapter 2).
Developed in the perspective of dialogical logic, chapter 11, by Jesse Alama and
Sara L. Uckelman, criticize the applicability of Lorenzen’s and Lorenz’s (1978) and
Lorenzen’s (1987) notion of dialogue games to everyday argumentative dialogue.
The two chapters that follow focus on specific aspects. Marcin Lewin´ski (‘‘Public
deliberation as a polylogue: challenges of argumentation analysis and evaluation’’,
ch. 12) interprets the context of public deliberation as one involving more than two
parties to an argumentative discussion. His problem is then how to interpret these
types of multi-party practice in light of the models of sound argumentation
developed in disciplines such as logic and dialectics (p. 224). He discusses the
features of polylogues which go beyond two-party argumentation and argues for the
need for modelling this type of interaction. In ‘‘Reconstructing and assessing the
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conditions of meaningfulness. An argumentative approach to presupposition’’ (ch.
13), Fabrizio Macagno discusses the role of the linguistic phenomenon of
presupposition in argumentation. He proposes to connect presupposition to the
epistemic notion of presumption (p. 252 ff).
In chapter 14, Bruno Leclercq investigates the connection between argumenta-
tion and mathematical proof, showing that formal proof is not sufficient even in
mathematics. In fact, because ‘‘there is an important demonstrative or ostensive
dimension to formal proofs’’ (p. 273), these latter are closer to visual rhetoric and
informal proofs than one could expect.
Elaborating on the connections between argumentation theory, on the one hand,
and semantics and pragmatics, on the other, Chapter 15 by Andrei Moldovan is at
the boundaries between argumentation and philosophy of language, as well as
linguistic semantics and pragmatics. The author focuses on the notion of
implicature, insisting on the distinction between what is said and what is implicated,
and argues against the existence of exclusively argumentative implicatures. His
claim is that argumentative analysis is often poor in terms of the analysis of
implicatures and this may lead ‘‘to unfortunate analyses of speech acts of arguing, as
well as to the general impression that logic is inapplicable to real life arguments’’ (p.
300).
Chapter 16 (‘‘Argumentation theory vs. formal logic: The case of scientific
argumentation and the ‘logic’ of controversies’’), by Xavier de Donato Rodrı´guez,
examines the context of scientific controversies. He first analyses this argumentation
context applying the method of (some) formal approaches, considering in particular
Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978) and Dung (1995); second, he interprets scientific
disagreement in terms of ‘‘informal’’ argumentation models. His view is that these
two types of approach—the informal and the formal one—can be fruitfully
combined. On the same line of thought, Maurice A. Finocchiaro’s programmatic
contribution (‘‘Logical theory, argumentation theory and meta-argumentation’’, ch.
17) aims at showing that it is possible to construct a project for the study of
argumentation, which he calls the meta-argumentation project, combining elements
of traditional formal deductive logic, recent informal logic, argumentation theory
and the historical-textual approach (Finocchiaro 2005).
The volume is concluded with Maria Marzano’s contribution titled ‘‘Logic and
fiction’’ (ch. 18), in which the author applies different logics to the analysis of
excerpts of literary texts taken from quite different sources. There is no conclusion
provided by the Editor to this collection of papers.
3 Discussion and Critical Remarks
An interesting aspect shared by many of the contributions in this volume is the
retrospective, sometimes apologetic, reflection (as in the case of Johnson’s chapter
6, cf. p. 120) proposed by informal logicians on the genesis and current status of
their discipline. Informal logic is, to some extent, derived from the same origin as
argumentation, i.e. discontent with the limits of formal logic as applied to model
natural language interactions (see for example Fisher, pp. 21-21; and Johnson,
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p. 123). As a consequence, informal logic aims at modelling argumentative
discourse; the object it deals with is at least partially overlapping with that of
argumentation. This makes the reflection on the role and cross-fertilization between
these two disciplines even more urgent.
Most importantly, however, what emerges this volume is that the problem about
the relation between argumentation and logic mainly amounts to a problem of
definition of (formal) logic (more than of argumentation). What is formal logic? One
of the aspects which are clearly stated in several chapters is that we should not speak
of one ‘‘logic’’ but of different ‘‘logics’’. It is a well-established acquisition that we
have different types of formal models, which are used to represent different aspects
of natural language. Among models of formal logic, one could mention for example
modal logic, which includes operators expressing modality; or fuzzy logic, which
admits for intermediate truth values between true and false (the binary opposition
1-0). Johnson (p. 117) suggests that, if we consider different logics, then we are
bound to admit that there might be different relations between these logics and
argumentation. Freeman (p. 77) maintains that these relations ‘‘are complex, but not
opaque’’ and that, as a consequence, they can be analysed and mapped. Johnson,
again, recalls that, historically, when informal logic originated as a reaction to
formal logic, opposition was indeed to an oversimplified version of logic presented
in introductory logic textbooks rather than to formal deductive logic per se (p. 120).
The same holds true for the origin of argumentation theory and critical thinking.
Therefore, it seems worth rethinking of the role of formal logic models in light of a
more comprehensive definition of the developments of this discipline. All in all, a
definition of logic(s) is probably one of the main issues to be thoroughly addressed
when approaching its possible contribution(s) to argumentation theory.
The main limitations of this volume are due to the fact that, while the central
problem of identifying a relation between argumentation and logic(s) is insightfully
approached in several chapters, a reader perceives some disconnection between
these theoretically-oriented chapters and the specific applications and case-studies
analysed by other authors. These latter sometimes lack connection to the general
problem addressed by this volume. This is probably the main limitation of this book,
which, although courageously attempting to describe an interesting topic and
despite being full of insightful considerations, lacks a unitary perspective. It is also
clearly acknowledgeable that not all the authors are involved in a regular dialogue
on these topics. In this sense, the fact that the book lacks a conclusion or postface by
the Editor impoverishes it, despite the completeness of the Introduction, as the
reader is left with the impression that too many issues are left unresolved.
Probably as a corollary of this problem, one has the impression that some of the
authors are not well-informed on the other contributors’ research on the central
topic. As an example, take Moldovan’s suggestion to consider implicatures in the
analysis of argumentation, in order to distinguish what is said from what is
implicated. Contrary to what the author states, the analysis of implicit material in
argumentation is not new in the literature on argumentation. On the one hand, the
reconstruction of implicit premises has been broadly discussed (Macagno, this
volume, van Eemeren, this volume; see also Ennis 1982; Walton 2001, 2008; Bigi
and Greco Morasso 2012). On the other hand, the difference between argumentation
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as a communicated inference and forms of communicative (pragmatic) inferences,
such as implicatures, has been discussed as well (Rocci 2006).
Despite these weak points, my personal view is that this collection of papers
could be rightfully considered as a first valuable step in the direction of studying
how argumentation and logic are related and of understanding the place of formal
and informal logic in current studies on argumentation.
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